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Learning to become a High Reliability Organization in the food retail business 
Abstract 
     This case discusses Selectos, a retail chain based in El Salvador, which was put under 
severe strain when Walmart entered its domestic market, threatening the leading position it 
had acquired through many decades of investment. The case illustrates that Selectos 
succeeded in competing Vis a Vis Walmart because it implemented the principles of High 
Reliability Organizations. First, before Walmart entered the market, the Salvadoran 
company invested time and financial resources to audit its routines, finding several areas of 
improvement. Second, its core strategy was to focus on continuous improvements in its 
operations. Third, it engaged its workforce, and especially the shop floor managers, in the 
process of executing its strategy at the whole corporate level. Fourth, through consultation 
with the managers of its functional areas, it enacted systems to manage unexpected events, 
ranging from hurricanes to violent attacks on its facilities (preparation for unexpected 
events). The case is designed to illustrate how a domestic firm from an emerging market 
competes with a leading multinational corporation, emphasizing the importance of 
organizational learning, especially the development of routines and mechanisms that allow 
for flexibility and adaptability to changes in conditions.  
 
Key words: High Reliability Organizations, food retail, business strategy, emerging 
economies, domestic companies, MNCs  
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Learning to become a High Reliability Organization in the food retail business 
 
     Between the year 1970 and 2013 Selectos, a family business from El Salvador, had 
become the largest food retail group, accounting for over 63% of the domestic market with 
its 91 stores (Kiste, 2013). In the year 2004 Walmart approached Carlos Calleja, the Vice-
President of the chain, to discuss a possible acquisition. It was a turning point: Carlos knew 
that soon Walmart would be entering the market, threatening the comfortable position of 
market leader that Selectos had won through years of organic growth. It was not a truly 
unexpected event for Carlos, as Walmart had already entered and captured the majority of 
markets in the neighboring countries of Central America (Agin, & Ogien, 2011). However, 
whereas Carlos suspected that Walmart would eventually threaten Super Selectos’ position 
in El Salvador, his preoccupation was not shared at the corporate level. Area managers, for 
example purchasing and distribution managers, were unaware of the fact that in a very short 
time they would be facing the most formidable competitor in the world in their own turf. 
Even after they learned about the imminent threat, most managers did not seem to think that 
the arrival of Walmart would change their tasks. Carlos realized that unless his worries 
about Walmart were shared across the company, and a learning process began, the battle 
was lost before having begun. The other possibility was selling to Walmart and achieving a 
substantial financial reward. Carlos decided not to sell. It was a tough choice, which put at 
stake his family business, and the jobs of his managers and employees.  
     Carlos and his management team decided that to compete against Walmart they did not 
need to experiment with a new strategy. After all, their strategy gained them the leading 
position in the domestic market (Brenes & Montoya, 2011). Selectos’ brand was well 
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recognized, its network of shops covered most of the country, and its operations generated 
healthy profits. What they needed, was a new approach, which would allow improvements 
throughout the whole corporation.   
     Knowing they were the best in the market, he felt that the company had perhaps stopped 
questioning what could be done better. The challenge of competing with Walmart had to be 
shared across the whole organization, which needed to go through a serious self-review 
process. He estimated that it would be between one and three years before Walmart entered 
officially the Salvadoran market. Before that happened, they needed to audit their 
processes, identify areas of weakness, implement new routines, and reduce their 
vulnerability to the frequent crises that hindered the efficiency of their operations, such as 
the damages caused by the natural events that often affect Central American countries, 
including hurricanes and  floods (Ibarra, 2005).  His plan was to ensure that their strategy 
was implemented better and more efficiently, and that the organization moved from a 
comfortable leadership position to a continuous learning, alert position.  
     Between 2004 and 2006, Selectos implemented a series of organizational changes aimed 
at becoming a more mindful organization, an organization that knows how to learn from 
itself and how to manage risks and crises (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2008). 
Literature: High Reliability Organizations, learning and preparing for crises 
     A High Reliability Organization is a type of organization that performs successfully in 
highly volatile environments by adopting flexible practices and the continuous pursuit of 
improvement and learning in its operations (Garvin, 2000; Rochlin, 1993). Some 
commonly accepted examples of this type of organizations are  fire fighting units and 
aircraft carrier crews, which have to develop a special state of awareness and 
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communication skills in order to perform safely in circumstances where unexpected events 
may, and often do,  occur (Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld 2008). HROs differ from other 
organizations in the extent to which they prepare for different types of contingencies, 
investing in measures, routines and systems that allow for superior reliability, even if this 
results in lower financial results in the short run (Ndubisi, 2012; Porte & Consolini, 1998). 
HROs often choose to have some redundancies in their structures, ranging from multiple 
backup systems, to multiple supply routes and human resource allocations (Tamuz & 
Harrison, 2006). These redundancies generate extra costs, but they also allow them to 
function even when disruptive forces damage some of their divisions and systems or hinder 
them from performing their routines as planned (Rijpma, 1997) 
     Why is it important to study HRO’s?  Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) point out that 
centralized and heavily structured strategic planning may lead organizations to stop 
searching for gradual but continuous improvements in their operations, thereby loosing the 
ability to anticipate, perceive and manage different types of threats. The terrorist attacks of 
September 2001, the 2008-2009 financial crisis, as well as the Japanese tsunami, the 
London riots of 2011, and the Hurricane Katrina illustrated that black swans, events that are 
considered to be unpredictable and unlikely to happen, do occur, generating disruption even 
in the most sophisticated markets, such as Wall Street, and the most developed and global 
cities, such as London and New York (Harrington, Weiss &  Bhaktavatsalam , 2010; Taleb, 
2007). Managing in uncertain macroeconomic, social, political and environmental 
conditions is becoming an ever more important source of competitive advantage for 
corporations, especially those operating in emerging markets (Bremmer, 2005; Brenes, 
Montoya & Ciravegna, 2014).  By becoming more mindful, and more reliable, companies 
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can also learn to manage volatility and crises (Leveson, Dulac, Marais, & Carroll, 2009; 
Waller & Roberts, 2003)  
     According to the literature, there are five core features that characterize HROs: 
monitoring for small failures, reluctance to accept simplification, sensitivity to operations, 
commitment to resilience, and deference to expertise (Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld 2008).  
The first three of them deal with mechanisms to prevent failure. When an organization 
monitors for small failures it can understand their causes and take action to minimize risks 
before they aggravate. Being reluctant to simplification means avoiding to classify 
unexpected events in known categories, instead communicating with others within and 
without the organization and searching for alternative solutions and sources of critical 
information. Remaining sensitive to operations is the ability of an organization not to lure 
itself into believing its system is fully capable to mitigate risks because they have not 
occurred yet. HROs keep auditing their procedures and operations (Schulman, 2004). 
     The other two principles of HROs help managing problems once they have taken place. 
Commitment to resilience is the ability to put systems under stress in order to determine if it 
is possible to absorb it, keep working and learn from it.  According to Nemeth and Cook 
(2007, p.263), Resilience is “the ability of systems to survive and return to normal 
operation despite challenges”. 
     HROs practice deference to expertise when they do not rely exclusively on hierarchy to 
managing problems as they occur, they understand that some individuals may be better 
skilled to deal in some circumstances than others and expect them to step up and take 
control (Weick, et al.,  2008; Vogus, & Welbourne, 2003). 
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     Another extremely important practice that helps to adopt HRO’s principles is a good 
communication policy. Quarantelli, (1988) emphasizes the importance of communication, 
especially in what is communicated  instead of how is communicated and defines five types 
of communication to be observed in order to be effective at managing crises: (1) intra-
organizational; (2) interorganizational; (3) from organizations to the public; (4) from the 
public to the organizations; and (5) within systems of organizations.   Others authors 
support the role of a good communication policy; for Roberts (1990) it is important to have 
several channels enabled to report when an incident has occurred.  Not relying only in an 
official channel which can fail or deliver biased information. Hopkins (2009) indicates that 
a mindful leadership should encourage the bottom-up communication of bad news, and not 
to be afraid of reporting when a small, but not yet critical, failure has taken place.  Roberts, 
Bea & Bartles (2001) emphasize that an HRO is characterized by fluid communication  
across the hierarchical and functional borders of the organization, which contribute to its 
superior alertness and mindfulness (Cooke & Rohleder, 2006; Hopkins, 2009). 
     In spite of the rich theory supporting the importance of HROs, and the unfortunate 
recurrence of multiple unpredicted crises, HRO practices remain, by large, the domain of 
organizations operating in specific industries, such as aviation (Ndubisi, 2012). This case 
contributes to the HRO theory by illustrating that applying its principles allowed for 
superior performance in the food retail industry of El Salvador.  
El Salvador – Business Environment 
     With a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of US $23.8 billion, approximately US $3,800 
per inhabitant, El Salvador’s economy was ranking fourth in the region of Central America 
and Panama for 2012, with Guatemala, Costa Rica and Panama ranking first to third 
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respectively (World Bank, 2013). According to the Central Bank one of the country’s main 
sources of income was family remittances from the United States that reached US$3.9 
billion in 2012, a 7.2% growth over 2011.  It represents a monthly income for a family of 
five members of US$257; in El Salvador, the minimum wage for a worker in industry is 
US$245 before taxes and other law deductions. (Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión Social, 
El Salvador, 2013). 
     ECLAC (2012) has an estimated average inflation rate for Latin America and Caribbean 
close to 7.0% for the period from 2010-2012. According to El Salvador’s Banco Central de 
Reserva, from 2001 to 2008, inflation rate has been stable around 5.0%.  In December 
2009, El Salvador experienced a cumulative inflation rate of -0.2% (deflation). Since then, 
annual inflation rate has remained, on average, in less than 3.0% (0.8% in December 2012). 
     In the year 2008, income related consumers  were classified by El Salvador’s Consumer 
Protection Agency into three levels; about 100 municipalities rated as low-income markets, 
exhibiting  extreme poverty rates of 40.2% and average household incomes of US$201 
dollars;  146 municipalities rated as  moderate-income markets, with extreme poverty rates 
of 19.4% and an average household income of US$308 dollars;  only 16 municipalities 
obtained a rate as high-income markets  with one-digit extreme poverty rates (7.6%) and an 
average family income of US$534 dollars (see Table 1). In urban areas, 63.6% of 
consumers had no preferences regarding fresh or processed food; only 35.7% preferred 
fresh food and a small proportion (0.7%) only processed food.  In rural areas, unlike urban 
areas less consumers (55.4%) preferred fresh and processed goods, and there was a 
noticeable increase of consumers who buy only fresh (44.3%), while those who bought 
only processed remained similar (0.4%).  
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El Salvador is characterized by a turbulent past. It suffered from a civil war that lasted 
between the late 1970s and 1992, causing over 75.000 deaths (Meyer, 2012). Since the end 
of conflict El Salvador has been affected by high levels of armed violence, caused by the 
diffusion of organized crime gangs, called maras.  As a result, El Salvador has some of the 
highest murder rates in the world (Costa, 2012; see Table 2). This legacy of violence has 
resulted in El Salvador been ranked as 141 out 142 in the index: Business Costs of Crime 
and Violence compiled by the World Economic Forum, where the higher the riskier (World 
Economic Forum, 2011) 
The Salvadoran market is also affected by natural disasters.  In the year 2001, for 
example, earthquakes affected more than 1.2 million of people and killed about one 
thousand.  In 2005, Hurricane Stan and the eruption of Volcano Ilamatepec hit the country 
bringing devastation for thousands of people (SNET, 2008)  
This contributes to make El Salvador a highly volatile and difficult environment where 
to operate, especially for businesses that have long and complex supply chains, such as 
those of the food retail industry. 
 
Table 1 and Table 2 here  
The Global Retail Industry 
During the last twenty years, two trends characterized the retail business. First, the 
average size of stores increased. Second, the adoption of information and communications 
technologies (ICTs) centralized the management of operations. By the year 2009, massive 
layouts as hypermarkets and supermarkets became the trend in retail business accounting 
for a total of 46.4% of the retail market in the world, convenience stores with 30.7% rated 
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second while other smaller and specialized stores as food and beverage; pharmacies and 
beauty goods with 16.8%. Big store types as wholesale stores with membership clubs with 
1.6% (Datamonitor, 2011) 
Since the late 90’s, technological progress made in computing and telecommunications, 
especially on the internet, made possible for retail chains to have a better inventory 
management, allowing them to minimize waste and compromised financial resources on 
goods with no satisfactory turnaround by reducing the in-stock time of merchandise and  re-
stocking time (Holmes, 2001).  State-of-the-art information technology made possible to 
offer their products at a lower cost than competitors (Foster, Haltiwanger & Krizan, 2002)    
Loreto (2005) indicates that some of the most important retailers started using their own 
brands in some type of goods, and that allowed them to compete with better prices and not 
to depend too much on suppliers.  In general, suppliers who were able to differentiate their 
product had moderate power over the retailers, as long as their products were demanded by 
final consumers, but brand recognition not always represented consumer’s loyalty 
(Datamonitor 2011). Walmart has been the world leader in deploying the Every Day Low 
Prices (EDLP) strategy. EDLP means offering lower average prices than competitors on all 
products, everyday. This contrasts with retailers that have a niche strategy, for example 
offering a broader range of products at slightly higher prices than EDLP, or specializing in 
organic products. It also differs from the Hi-Low strategy. The Hi-Low strategy, which 
Selectos deployed long before the arrival of Walmart, entails attracting consumers with 
promotions on selected products, which change frequently. The products on promotion tend 
to be heavily discounted, below the prices of EDLP retailers, whereas all of the products 
outside of the promotions are sold at higher prices, which is why the strategy is defined as 
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Hi-Low.  Hi-Low strategies entail higher organizational costs. Unless promotions are a one 
off affair, having a Hi-Low strategy throughout the year means planning and launching a 
high number of different discount packages, market them to attract potential clients, and 
change the way in which supplies are planned, delivered and redisplayed in shops 
accordingly. 
Walmart United States of America 
Walmart, the largest retailer in the world, has been from its beginning linked to EDLP 
strategy, and a large part of its success may be explained because it adopted some of the 
HRO’s core principles. Walmart has remained sensitive to operations, refusing to believe 
they have developed a perfect system: In 1962, after going public, Walmart invested its 
new financial resources to build its distribution centers network, which allowed it to buy 
cheaper and store until distribution was necessary. In 2010, Walmart’s distribution network 
in United States included 129 centers. As a result, Walmart’s distribution costs represented 
2-3% of its income while 4-5% for its competitors (Walmart, 2012).  In tune with global 
tendencies in retail business, the use of  the latest ICTs allowed it to manage its sales and 
inventory information from a monthly basis in the 60s, to a weekly basis in the 70s and 
finally, in real time by the end of the 90s. As if the later was not enough, Walmart started 
involving their suppliers even more, which is the case of the Central Retail Link, a inter-
enterprise platform that allowed suppliers to have sales data from point of sales (POS), 
sales trends in previous years and inventories of their product by store. Thus suppliers 
constituted another vigilant eye for the success of the supply chain. It was estimated that the 
cost of the center was approximately US $4 billion (Oberholzer-Gee, 2006). 
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Walmart also practices deference to expertise: although been the biggest retail chain in 
the United States, Walmart doesn’t rely on a highly centralized hierarchy,  as a example, 
product selection is not the same for every store as Walmart sold products based the 
particular needs of each store and store managers have to give their inputs to stay in tune 
with their customers Initiatives like Volume Producing Item contest, in which managers had 
to look for and promote items that had the potential to increase income, managers were 
motivated to analyze and improve their decision-making constantly. 
Other important principle of HROs which Walmart adopted from his founder; maintain 
commitment to resilience:  For Sam Walton, his partners or associates were the most 
important ingredient in achieving and maintaining success. His policies and practices 
included a practice that enabled them to face changes in industry, a communication inter-
departmental, as Walton promoted sharing performance information with personnel, asking 
for employee ideas, offering incentives and participation in stock options and maintaining 
an open-door policy among others (Walmart, 2013). Walmart committed more resources 
than other retailers on training and prefer promotions form inside for its managers which 
constitute positive working conditions. However, all initiatives were conditioned in order to 
maintain a strict limit on payroll expenses, which at one time represented half of total 
operating expenses. Walmart employee’s salaries are usually close to minimum wage plus a 
bonus that varied depending on the goals accomplished with respect to profit and losses.  
The Retail Industry in El Salvador 
The retail business in El Salvador is concentrated in few competitors. In 2011 (USDA, 
2011) Calleja SA and Walmart Central America dominate the market with 165 stores 
between them. Group Saca -ceased operations in 2013- (El Mundo, 2013) owned four 
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supermarkets and one hypermarket; Pricesmart had 2 Club Outlets. Other type of stores 
include: about 138 convenience stores (USDA, 2011), mostly located at gas stations. 
Approximately, 70,000 neighborhood stores, most of them manage inventory of less than 
US$500 and less than 3m2. And City markets which offered fresh fruits and vegetables, 
basic grains, beef, pork, poultry, eggs and fish, with locales measuring 3x3 meters. In El 
Salvador, it was estimated that the Capital City, San Salvador, had around seven markets, 
or at least one in each town (Salinas, 2008) 
El Salvador’s retail market before 1950 consisted exclusively in public plazas or city 
markets, with no appropriate sanitation.  In 1951, the first self-service retail store to appear 
in El Salvador’s was called Sumesa. One year later, refrigeration systems allowed it to offer 
fruits and perishable foods.  
Since then (1950) until today, El Salvador retail chain industry has evidenced new 
participants begin and going out of business, while it has evolved to a more concentrated 
market:  Since the 70’s until the late 90’s, there have been almost a dozen different 
competitors.  In 2011, there are two main competitors (Grupo Calleja S.A. and Walmart 
Mexico and Central America) with an estimated 85% of market; for 2013, Selectos’ market 
share is 63%  
Other important characteristics:  the main competitors cover almost the complete 
territory, but while Walmart’s preferred store type are discount and warehouse stores 
(400m2 -700m2) (Rodas, 2013), Grupo Calleja established Selectos Market brand for cities 
far from San Salvador, these stores have supermarket-type service in a 600 square meter 
store and lower prices than a full size supermarket store but most expensive than a discount 
store.   
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Walmart in Central America 
Walmart’s entrance in Central America took place in September 2005 by acquiring one-
third of the Central American Retail Holding Company (CARHCO), a commercial alliance 
among Grupo La Fragua (Guatemala) with Royal Ahold (Holland) owning two-thirds 
between them; and an additional third belonging to Corporación Supermercados Unidos 
(Costa Rica). By acquiring a quote of CARHCO, Walmart became the  co-owner of seven 
hypermarkets, 55 supermarkets, one warehouse membership club and more than 190 
discount stores, for a total of  254 stores all over Central America,(El Diario de Hoy, 2011).   
The next year, Walmart Mexico acquired an additional 17,7% in order to become the 
controlling shareholder with  51% of the alliance  which changed its name to Walmart 
Centroamerica.   
In El Salvador, Walmart Centroamerica acquired the ownership of 56 stores that prior 
belonged to CARHCO which can be disaggregated in 31 La Despensa de Don Juan 
Supermarkets, two Hyper Paiz and 23 Despensa Familiar.  Since then, Walmart decided to 
grow by relying on warehouses or discount stores:  in 2013 there are a total of 81 stores, 28 
new Despensa Familiar (discount store), and three new stores from a new brand called 
Maxi Despensa (also discount store); in the other hand, supermarket type stores like La 
Despensa de Don Juan have reduced their amount of stores to 25 (Walmart, 2013)  
By the year of 2010, Walmart Mexico merged  with Walmart Central America, the new 
company’s name is Walmart Mexico y Centroamerica both operations totaled 519 stores, 
11 distribution centers  and agro-industrial operations that supplied  perishable goods to  
stores in the region (Wal-Mart de México, 2011).  This decision proved to be effective by 
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increasing their production capacity by 3.7% and their total sales by almost 7% or a total 
amount of more than 3.6 billion dollar.   
In spite of its positive results, Walmart Mexico and Central America decided that they 
had still space to improve on lowering costs, especially on operational efficiency, which 
would help to transfer savings to product prices and, therefore,  competing better with local 
rivals.  Some of the actions taken, for example, included adopting LED lighting systems, 
and bettering their distribution center’s logistic processes in order to reduce suppliers 
waiting time to deliver goods by 15%, as well as the amount of stores served by 30% 
(Brenes & Montoya, 2011)  
But something was missing in Walmart Mexico and Central America:  since its arrival 
there was a feeling that they were not competing as a true Walmart.  Some measures had to 
be taken (Brenes & Montoya, 2011). The Executive Vice-president and COO for Central 
America, Alberto Ebrard mentioned: 
 The first thing was to redefine the correct client that each store targeted and redirect 
business strategies based on those clients. For example, even though the Maxi Bodega 
format is a warehouse, it had much higher prices than discount store formats. We are re-
launching the Bodega, lowering prices, improving selection and changing the name to 
Maxi Pali or Maxi Despensa to put it under our umbrella of discount stores. (Walmart 
México, 2011)  
Other important changes considered were stop using CARHCO brand names for 
supermarkets and hypermarkets, they must start incorporating Walmart’s brand to 
supermarket stores and changing hypermarkets to Walmart Supercenters.  
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Scot Rank, Walmart Mexico and Central America CEO, and Alberto Edbrard, suggest 
that the best manner to exploit Walmart’s advantages should be switching from the regional 
strategies adopted until the date by Central America operations, in which every country has 
its own characteristics to aligning to Walmart’s global strategy and start benefiting of its 
efficiency in operations (Walmart, 2011). Clients and suppliers should start noticing 
changes to be implemented in the next years. 
Selectos 
In the year 2013, Selectos had a market share of 63%, (López, 2013) 91 stores across the 
country, including the first online grocery shop. At the same time, it has increased its 
presence throughout the country, its products and services are adapted to each community 
and have implemented computing systems in order to have a better logistics management, 
especially regarding to inventory control; but their success is not explained by those actions 
only.  Selectos has achieved its leadership position by mastering some core principles of 
High Reliability Organizations that led it to take the right decisions in times of heavy 
uncertainty: the years after Walmart made clear its intentions of entering the Salvadoran 
market. 
In 1963, the supermarket chain Sumesa, one of the pioneer retailers in El Salvador, was 
acquired by Daniel Calleja, who founded Grupo Calleja SA is born.  The same year, Grupo 
Calleja opened the first Super Selectos store.  
  In 1978, Selectos bought Todos Supermarket (five stores). Then, in the 90's, acquired 
other three supermarkets chains: El Sol (four stores), Multimart (one store) and La 
Tapachulteca (13 stores). After that, in 2000, Selectos, acquired a retail chain called Todos 
por Menos (14 stores) and changed their brand mark to De Todo; the new  stores measured 
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an average 600m2 and served municipalities and cities far from the Capital City area, San 
Salvador.  Thus, in 2000 Selectos totaled 69 stores through the entire country, and three 
different brand marks: Super Selectos, La Tapa Supermarkets and De Todo supermarkets 
with a payroll of more than 5,000 employees. 
In 2003, Walmart expressed its intention of buying Selectos. The Group responded by 
opening its 70th store, located in Mall MultiPlaza. Since then, Selectos has increased its 
presence to 91 stores, including the first online store foods: www.superselectos.com 
(López, 2013). 
By the year of 2010, in order to best serve different type of customers, especially those 
outside of San Salvador area, Selectos started relying in only two brand-marks under which 
to work: Super Selectos (67 stores) with an average area of 1,250 m2, located mainly in 
urban areas, oriented to middle and upper income clients and offering more than 35,000 
SKU's. And, Selectos Market (15 stores) with an average area of 600 m2 and 15,000 SKU's 
serving smaller towns with low to middle-income, it price level was 5% to 7% lower than 
at Super Selectos.  Although Selectos Market aims to serve lower-income customers, it is 
not a discount store. In both concepts, customer service was similar:  both offered air 
conditioning, provided grocery bags and advertised more than 800 promotions per month. 
These similarities made clients perceive both types of stores simply as Selectos (See Table 
3) 
Table 3 here 
The most obvious question is how a domestic firm could compete to a leading 
multinational company and consistently make the right decisions to become the leader in its 
market? A major component of success of Selectos has been the practice of reviewing 
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(auditing) processes and strategy, learning from its mistakes and taking the necessary 
decisions to overcome them, led by the will of the CEO to ensure the company learned and 
improved instead of simply being content with its market leader position.  
Some of the processes audited before the arrival of Walmart include Marketing: Hi-low 
has been the Selectos preferred marketing and pricing strategy. However, the management 
team considered that it was necessary to understand Selectos customer’s perception in order 
to align it with its vision.  Store design was also re-evaluated, as well as the manner of how 
goods are arranged in shelf and other basic issues such as hygiene and quality processes. As 
a result of such processes, Selectos obtained some inputs to diversify its range of products 
and services, create a new and true customer service culture and allocate more resources in 
a more effectively manner to advertising and promotions.  These audits by themselves 
increase mindfulness. By asking questions to get people talking, organizations review past 
crises as learning opportunities (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007) 
HROs focus on operations; technology systems are essential components for a retailer 
strategy and they are permanently under stress and have many close calls that prove that 
something is wrong because it almost crash (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007):   The literature on 
High Reliability Organizations points that information technology systems are one of the 
areas particularly vulnerable to crisis as they tend to lack flexibility (Roberts, Bea & 
Bartles, 2001;). Before the arrival of Walmart, Selectos had deployed information 
technology only in certain areas of the business. Through its auditing, it found that several 
functional divisions suffered from poor coordination, for example there was unreliable 
information regarding sales and scheduling. This made it particularly difficult to monitor 
theft, which in some of the geographic areas where it operated amount to about 15% of the 
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value of its sales. In spite of being the dominant player, there was much that could be 
improved. The senior management responded by providing information about the losses the 
company was unnecessarily facing due to theft and bad coordination. Before investing in 
new technological systems, the company went through a training campaign aimed at 
ensuring that all of the employed understood that reducing these inefficiencies would help 
preserving their jobs in the future. As Pearson and Clair (1998) point out, communication 
throughout the corporation is an essential feature of HROs, which ensures that strategies 
and objectives are shared and understood.  
Selectos subsequently invested US$3 million in technology systems that helped 
managing the supply chain, sales, and stocking more efficiently. They began using an 
Integrated Business Management System (IBMS) (Control Logistics System, 2011) and a 
Point of Sale (POS) Information System (ALFASA, 2011). In 2006, one year after 
Walmart’s official entrance in the market, all of their stores had these systems, which 
allowed them to plan operations better. In order to avoid vulnerability to systemic failure, 
Selectos invested in multiple back-ups for its data, which protected the information 
accumulated from viruses, hackers, and also physical damage to one of its information 
technology hubs. Used to operate in a region affected by hurricanes, earthquakes, and also 
civil disturbances and unrest, Carlos wanted to ensure that automation would not result in 
the risk of temporary break down of his supply chain. He choose to invest rather more than 
the strict necessary, prioritizing reliability over efficiency, and ensuring that the systems 
adopted were flexible and adaptable in case of emergency (Weick et al. 2008; Leveson et 
al., 2009). 
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Improvement is a process that occurs through learning and sharing of knowledge. From 
identifying areas of concern, through discussing them with people involved; and then, the 
use of expertise (Porte & Consolini, 1998). Walmart’s entry in El Salvador forced Selectos 
to initiate a process of organizational restructuring in order to improve processes and create 
knowledge within the company. A renewal in key management (especially the purchasing 
and category management) had to be implemented, new managers should have more skills, 
better economic incentives tied to the company's goal of evolving from family to 
professional enterprise;  for Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) expertise is not simply an issue of 
content knowledge. Instead, it consists of knowledge plus credibility, trust and 
attentiveness.  Selectos also took the opportunity offered for friendly supermarket chains in 
Central America and acquired the best practices after adapting them to the Salvadoran 
culture.  
Once Walmart accomplished its entrance to El Salvador, Selectos had already completed 
important upgrades to how they managed operations but maintained its commitment to 
improve. Selectos decided to stick to its Hi-low pricing strategy and pursue continuous 
improvements in the way it executed it as opposed to imitating its much larger competitor 
Walmart.  One of the elements of weakness they identified during the auditing process was 
the fact that some of their food suppliers struggled to comply with their requirements, 
which became ever stricter as they improved their operations management. The 
continuously changing demand pattern that characterizes retailers adopting Hi-Low 
strategies entailed the need for flexible and yet very reliable suppliers. Store managers 
provided strategic information revealing that in some product areas the problem was 
affecting performance. After having consulted with purchasing, distribution and store 
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managers, the CEO of Selectos decided to vertically integrate production in the areas where 
issues were identified. The Salvadoran company set aside US$13 million to build an agro-
industrial meat and poultry processing plant, fruit and vegetable packaging plant, and 
bakeries. By 2010, goods produced in house accounted for an average of 3% to 4% of 
annual sales.  
The investment was risky, and it entailed a further process of organizational learning, 
moving into the direct production of some of the goods sold, and also into the building and 
managing of brands. Selectos hired new personnel and re-structured its operations to 
accommodate the role of the new in-house production facilities. In only two years the 
investments undertaken allowed it to improve further its operations, reducing the 
inefficiencies that characterized restocking of certain food items when promotions changed. 
Exploiting its superior knowledge of the domestic economy, Selectos also invested in 
searching for local firms that could potentially supply the goods that retailers imported in El 
Salvador, in particular fruit and vegetables. There were many reasons for doing this. First, 
Selectos presented itself as a local retailer, and wanted to ensure that it was perceived to be 
more local than its rivals. Offering more local products and communicating to customers 
the fact that it was making an effort to source locally was in line with its corporate 
marketing strategy. Second, although imports were in the short run easier to obtain, in the 
case of disruptions to the main international trade lines, local suppliers would provide a 
more reliable source of highly perishable products. Again, Selectos invested with a long 
term perspective that maximized reliability instead of short term profitability (Roberts et 
al., 2001). 
22 
 
 
 
 
In 2011, after more than five years competing head-to-head with the most effective retail 
chain in the world, Selectos not only survived, but gained market share in El Salvador.  
They continued executing their Hi-low strategy; their level of prices ranking in the middle 
between Walmart's supermarket concept (La Despensa de Don Juan) and Walmart's 
discount stores (Despensa Familiar).  Around of 63% of consumers seemed to confirm it by 
ranking Selectos as the number one supermarket (Brenes & Montoya, 2011)  
According to Selectos, net sales had a inter-annual grow rate of 8%, for the period 2004-
2010, accounting for US $551 million at the end of that lapse (See Table 4).  Their 
EBITDA (earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation and amortization) as a percentage of 
sales rated around 6% (Brenes & Montoya, 2011), Whole Foods reports for 2008-2011 an 
average operating margin of 4,2% (Whole Foods, 2012). 
Table 4 here 
According to Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) an organization is resilient if it can absorb strain 
and keep working, even when things are hard, if it can bounce back from crises and if it can 
learn from them. Having deployed the new technology systems, Carlos run the auditing 
exercise again, trying to find other areas where operations could be improved. After 
completing this second, yearlong auditing exercise, the management team of Selectos 
realized that even the most efficient and smoothly run stores often reported problems. After 
consulting the managers of each store, they found that unexpected and yet not completely 
uncommon events severely damaged the efficiency of Selectos’ operations. Some of the 
stores, for example, were located in areas where landslides and flood affected infrastructure 
during the rainy seasons. Although the stores were equipped to function through power 
cuts, many suppliers were delaying their deliveries citing as their causes problems as road 
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interruption, damages to their refrigerators. Selectos worked jointly with its suppliers to 
design procedures to follow in order to minimize delays in the event of minor natural 
disasters. The systems were tested in different moments to verify the response of both the 
stores and the suppliers. By sharing its organizational knowledge, Selectos developed a 
more efficient supply chain network, better suited to operate in a volatile environment such 
as El Salvador.  When Hurricane Agatha struck El Salvador in the year 2010 (El Universo, 
2010), Selectos quickly adapted to the situation. Having planned for similar events and run 
multiple simulations helped the company manage through the period of major disruption 
caused by the natural disaster. Suppliers used alternative routes to deliver their goods, and 
in some cases they were re-routed to different warehouses, as planned in the simulations. 
The human resource department managed numerous changes to accommodate for the 
difficulty of getting to work that many of the employees faced. In house production of 
certain goods was ramped up in order to reduce reliance on external suppliers. The 
investments undertaken to manage frequent minor crises proved valuable when a larger 
natural disaster hit El Salvador. The flexibility and gradually-acquired reliability of 
Selectos as an organization it allowed it to manage better the consequences of black swans, 
the unexpected events that have the potential to disrupt operations and cause immense 
damages (Taleb, 2007; Weick et al., 2008). The experience of Selectos has relevant insights 
for firms, managers and entrepreneurs operating in risky and volatile environments, such as 
economies affected by frequent natural disasters. It illustrates that investments in reliability, 
learning processes, flexible systems, and gradual improvements to operations, may in the 
short run be costly, but in the medium and long run do pay off, even when competing 
against more resourceful rivals.  
24 
 
 
 
 
References 
Agin, D & Ogien T. (2011). Latin 500: Walmart: Latin American Success. Latin Trade, 
Aug 02, 2011 http://latintrade.com/2011/08/latin-500-walmart-latin-american-success, 
accessed 17 September 2013. 
ALFASA (2011) Sistema de Información de Punto de Venta (P.O.S.), Alfasa.com. 
http://www.alfasa.com/punto.htm, accessed 14 November 2013. 
Bigley, G. A., & Roberts, K. H. (2001). The incident command system: High-reliability 
organizing for complex and volatile task environments. Academy of Management 
Journal, 44(6), 1281-1299. 
Bremmer, I. (2005). Managing Risk in an Unstable World. Harvard Business Review, June 
2005. 51-60. 
Brenes, E & Montoya, D. (2011). Super Selectos: Winning the war against multinationals?. 
INCAE Business School, Case Study 0172. 
Brenes, E. R., Montoya, D., & Ciravegna, L. (2014). Differentiation strategies in emerging 
markets: The case of Latin American agribusinesses. Journal of Business Research, 
67(5), 847-855. 
Carlton, D. & Perloff J. (2000). Modern Industrial Organization. Addison Wesley 
Longman, 3rd Edition. 
Control Logistic System S.A. (2011). SIGES. Control Logistic System S.A website. 
http://www.cls.es/frame_gen(a).htm,  accessed 10 April, 2011. 
25 
 
 
 
 
Cooke, D. L., & Rohleder, T. R. (2006). Learning from incidents: from normal accidents to 
high reliability. System Dynamics Review, 22 (3), pp. 213-239. 
Costa, G. (2012). La Situación de la Seguridad Ciudadana en América Latina. Inter-
American Dialogue. Working Paper, Feb 2012. 
Datamonitor (2011).  Global Food Retail.  Datamonitor. www.datamonitor.com, accessed 
20 June 2011. 
Defensoría del consumidor (2008). Perfil del consumidor salvadoreño en el Siglo XXI.  
PNUD. 
ECLAC (2012). Informe Macroecnómico – El Salvador. 
http://www.cepal.org/publicaciones/xml/5/46985/ElSalvador-completo-web.pdf, 
accessed 13 October, 2013. 
El Diario de Hoy (2011). Grupo Paiz busca alianzas en el país. El Diario de Hoy. 
November 7th, 2011. www.elsalvador.com/noticias/2001/11/7/NEGOCIOS/negoc2.html 
accessed, 3November, 2013.   
El Mundo (2013). Supermercados Europa cierran operaciones. El Mundo. February 3rd, 
2013. http://elmundo.com.sv/supermercados-europa-cierran-operaciones, accessed 10 
October, 2013. 
El Universo (2010). El huracán Agatha golpea con fuerza a Guatemala y El Salvador. El 
Universo, May 30th, 2010. http://www.eluniverso.com/2010/05/31/1/1361/huracan-
agatha-golpea-fuerza-guatemala-salvador.html, accessed 29 October, 2013. 
26 
 
 
 
 
Foster, L., Haltiwanger, J. & Krizan, C.J. (2002): The Link between Aggregate and 
Microproductivity Growth: Evidence from Retail Trade. National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Working Paper N° 9120. 
Garvin, D.A. (2000). Learning In Action-  A Guide to Putting the Learning Organization to 
Work.  Harvard Business School Press. Boston.  
Harrington, S., Weiss M. &  Bhaktavatsalam S. (2010): Pimco Sells Black Swan Protection 
as Wall Street Markets Fear.  Bloomberg. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-
20/pimco-sells-black-swan-protection-as-wall-street-profits-from-selling-fear.html, 
accessed 27 September, 2013. 
Holmes, T.J. (2001). Bar Codes Lead to Frequent Deliveries and Superstores. Rand Journal 
of Economics, Vol. 32, N° 4 (Winter 2001), pp. 708-725. 
Hopkins, A. (2009). Failure to learn: The BP Texas City refinery disaster. Australia: CCH 
Australian Limited. 
Ibarra, A.M. (2005): Comarcas Vulnerables: Riesgos y desastres naturales en 
Centroamérica y el Caribe. Editorial CRIES. First Edition,  pp. 97-108 
Kiste, F. (2013). Aumenta a 63% la cuota de mercado de Súper Selectos. El Mundo. 
http://elmundo.com.sv/aumenta-a-63-la-cuota-de-mercado-de-super-selectos, accessed 
15 September, 2013. 
Leveson, N., Dulac, N., Marais, K., & Carroll, J. (2009). Moving beyond normal accidents 
and high reliability organizations: a systems approach to safety in complex systems. 
Organization Studies, 30(2-3), pp. 227-249. 
27 
 
 
 
 
López, A. (2013). Salvadoreño Super Selectos lanza tienda en línea. Estrategia y Negocios, 
August 26, 2013. http://www.estrategiaynegocios.net/blog/2013/08/26/salvadoreno-
super-selectos-lanza-tienda-en-linea/, accessed 27 October, 2013. 
Loreto L. (2005). Cambios en la industria de los supermercados concentración, 
hipermercados, relaciones con proveedores y marcas propias. Universidad de los Andes, 
Santiago. Published Studies, 97. www.cepchile.cl/dms/lang_1/doc_3472.html, accessed 
27 october, 2013.  
Meyer, R. (2012). Peacetime Violence in El Salvador and Honduras: A Tale of Two 
Countries. International Catalan Institute for Peace, Working Paper No. 2012/6. 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2206264 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2206264, accessed 
October, 2013.  
Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión Social de El Salvador (2013). Salario Mínimo en El 
Salvador 2009-2013. Power point 
presentation.http://issuu.com/prensamtps/docs/salario_minimo_comparativo_2009-
2013-11, accessed 20 October, 2013. 
Ndubisi, N. O. (2012). Mindfulness, reliability, pre-emptive conflict handling, customer 
orientation and outcomes in Malaysia's healthcare sector. Journal of Business 
Research, 65(4), pp. 537-546.  
Nemeth, C., & Cook, R. (2007). Reliability versus resilience: What does healthcare need? 
In Dominguez, C. (Ed.), Symposium on high reliability in healthcare. Human Factors 
and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting Proceedings. pp. 621-625, Baltimore, MD, 1-5 
October. 
28 
 
 
 
 
Oberholzer-Gee, Felix (2006). "Wal-Mart's Business Environment." Harvard Business 
School, Case 706-453. 
Pearson, C. M., & Clair J.A. (1998). Reframing crisis management. Academy of 
management review 23(1): pp. 59-76. 
Porte, T. L., & Consolini, P. (1998). Theoretical and operational challenges of “high-
reliability organizations”: air-traffic control and aircraft carriers. International Journal of 
Public Administration, 21(6-8), 847-852. 
Quarantelli, E. L. (1988). Disaster crisis management: A summary of research findings. 
Journal of management studies, 25(4), 373-385. 
Rijpma, J.A. (1997). Complexity, tight-coupling and reliability: Connecting normal 
accidents theory and high reliability theory. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis 
Management, 5(1), pp. 15–23. 
Roberts, K. (1990). Some characteristics of one type of high reliability organisation. 
Organization Science, 1 (2), pp. 160-176. 
Roberts, K. H., Bea, R. & Bartles, D. L. (2001). Must accidents happen? Lessons from 
high-reliability organizations. The Academy of Management Executive, 15(3), 70-78. 
Rochlin, G. I. (1993). Defining “high reliability” organizations in practice: a taxonomic 
prologue. In K. H. Roberts (Ed.), New challenges to understanding organizations (pp. 
11-32). New York: Macmillan. 
29 
 
 
 
 
Rodas, A. (2013). Inauguran la sucursal 52 de Despensa Familiar. ElSalvador.com. 7 
October 
2013.http://www.elsalvador.com/mwedh/nota/nota_completa.asp?idCat=47861&idArt=
8228864, accessed 7 November,  2013. 
Salinas, C. (2008). Comprar al fiado en las pulperías. El País. December 14, 2008. 
Available from: http://elpais.com/diario/2008/12/14/negocio/1229262746_850215.html , 
accessed February, 2012.   
Schulman, P. R. (2004). General attributes of safe organizations. Quality and Safety in 
Health Care. 13, Supplement 2 39-44 
Servicio Nacional de Estudios Territoriales (SNET) (2008). Recopilación histórica de los 
desastres en El Salvador 1900-2005. http://www.snet.gob.sv/page.php?id=414&p=133, 
accessed 1st November, 2013. 
Taleb, N. N. (2007). Black swans and the domains of statistics. The American Statistician, 
61(3), pp. 198-200. 
Tamuz, M. & Harrison, M. I. (2006). Improving safety in hospitals: Contributions of high 
reliability theory and normal accident theory. Health Research and Educational Trust, 
41 (4), pp. 1654-1673. 
Vogus, T. J., & Welbourne, T. M. (2003). Structuring for high reliability: HR practices and 
mindful processes in reliability‐ seeking organizations. Journal of Organizational 
Behavior, 24(7), pp. 877-903. 
30 
 
 
 
 
Waller, M. J., & Roberts, K. H. (2003). High reliability and organisational behaviour: 
Finally the twain must meet. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 24, pp. 813-814. 
Walmart (2013). 10 Rules for Building a Business. Wal-Mart 
website.http://corporate.walmart.com/our-story/heritage/10-rules, accessed 20 October 
2013.   
Walmart (2013): Our locations – El Salvador.http://corporate.walmart.com/our-
story/locations/el-salvador, accessed 20 October 2013. 
Wal-Mart de México (2009). Walmart De México Adquiere Operación De Walmart En 
Centroamérica. Wal-Mart 
Mexico.http://www.walmex.mx/assets/files/Informacion%20financiera/BMV/BMV/Esp/
2009/12062009%20-Adquiere%20Operacion%20De%20Walmart%20En%20CA.pdf, 
accessed 18 February 2012. 
Wal-Mart de México (2011). Webcast Resultados del Tercer Trimestre 2011. Wal-Mart 
Mexico.http://www.walmex.mx/, accessed 7 February 2011.   
Weick, K. E. (1987). Organizational culture as a source of high reliability. National 
Emergency Training Center. 
Weick, K. E., Sutcliffe, K. M., & Obstfeld, D. (2008). Organizing for high reliability: 
Processes of collective mindfulness. Crisis management, 3, pp. 81-123. 
 Weick, K.E. & Sutcliffe K.M. (2007). Managing the Unexpected: Resilient Performance in 
an Age of Uncertainty. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco 
31 
 
 
 
 
Whole Foods Market (2012), 2012 Annual Report. 
http://www.wholefoodsmarket.com/sites/default/files/media/Global/Company%20Info/P
DFs/2012-WFM_Annual_Report.pdf, accessed 15 October, 2013. 
World Bank, (2013). Data -El 
Salvador.http://www.bancomundial.org/es/country/elsalvador, accessed 20 October 
2013. 
World Bank, (2013). GDP per capita, PPP (current international 
$).http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?page=1, accessed 22 
October, 2013. 
World Bank, (2013). Poverty gap at national poverty line 
(%).http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAGP/countries, accessed 22 October, 
2013. 
World Economic Forum (2011). The Global Competitiveness Report, 2011-2012, Full data.  
World Economic Forum (1), p.403 
 
32 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Classification of Market Segment by Income 
Category Income US$ 
A Greater than or equal 
to 3500  
B 2500 to 3499 
C+ 1500 to 2499 
C 1000 to 1499 
C- 600 to 999 
D 250 to 599 
Source: Grupo Calleja 
 
 
Table 2 – 
Business Environment: El Salvador and the USA,  
 USA El Salvador 
 2006 2011 2006 2011 
GDP per capita (PPP) 44,623 48,113 6,070 6,856 
People living under poverty line (%) N/A N/A 30.7 40.6 
Ranking in the Business Costs of 
Crime and Violence (the higher the 
worst) 
36th of 122 81st of 142 118th of 122 141st of 142 
Homicides per 100,000 inhabitants 6.0 5.0 (2010) 65 69 
Source:  World Economic Forum (2011), World Bank, data (2013) 
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Table 3 
 
El Salvador’s retail industry, by type of store (2010)  
Type of Store Brand Owner Number of stores 
Hypermarket 
(>2500 m2) 
Hiper Paiz Walmart 2 
Hiper Europa Grupo Saca 1 
Supermarket 
(400 - 2500 m2) 
Super Selectos Calleja S.A** 69 
Selectos Market Calleja S.A** 13 
Despensa de Don Juan Walmart 32 
Despensa Familiar* Walmart 47 
Supermercados Europa Grupo Saca 4 
Club Outlets PriceSmart 
Joint Venture 
US/Salvadorians 
2 
* Warehouse - discount store type. 
** Calleja S.A or Grupo Calleja, owner of Super Selectos and Selectos Market brands 
Source: Grupo Calleja and Walmart. 
 
Table 4 
 
Annual Sales of Super Selectos 
Year 
Net Sales  
(millions 
US$) 
2006 403 
2007 440 
2008 446 
2009 514 
2010 551 
Source: Grupo Calleja 
 
